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Of relevance being a decision of The Supreme Court of Canada in the matter of Trociuk v. Attorney General of British Columbia (2003-SCC-34) wherein it is writ:
Sections of the Vital Statistics Act violate s. 15(1) of the Charter because they constitute discrimination on the basis of sex. The impugned provisions explicitly draw a distinction on an enumerated ground, and the claimant was subject to differential treatment on the basis of that ground. On the basis of his sex, the impugned provisions expose the father to the possible arbitrary exclusion of his particulars from his children’s birth registration and, consequently, of his participation in choosing their surname. Moreover, having been so exposed, the father is provided no recourse. The impugned distinctions affect significant interests and do so in a way that the reasonable claimant in the appellant’s circumstances would perceive as harmful to his dignity. A birth registration is not only an instrument of prompt recording. It evidences the biological ties between parent and child, and including one’s particulars on the registration is a means of affirming these ties. Contribution to the process of determining a child’s surname is another significant mode of participation in the life of a child. For many in our society, the act of naming a child holds great significance, is often the occasion for celebration and symbolizes familial bonds across generations. Arbitrary exclusion from these means of participation negatively affects an interest that is significant to a father. It is the possibility of his arbitrary and absolute exclusion from the birth registration and the process of naming that gives rise to the reasonable father’s perception that his dignity has been infringed.
The fact that the impugned provisions permit a mother to “unacknowledge” for good reasons, for example where pregnancy results from rape or incest, does not justify arbitrarily exposing a father, without recourse, to the possible disadvantages that flow from an unacknowledgment that protects neither her legitimate interests nor the best interests of the child.
The impugned provisions are not saved under s. 1 of the Charter. While the Act’s objective — namely, the accurate and prompt recording of births — is sufficiently important to warrant overriding Charter rights and the legislation is rationally connected to that legislative objective, the impugned provisions do not impair the rights of fathers as little as reasonably possible. The risks of mothers falsifying records from fear of the potential negative effects consequent on applications by fathers who have been justifiably unacknowledged can be essentially eliminated through means that do not negatively affect unjustifiably unacknowledged fathers’ interests. Moreover, the legislature itself has chosen means that are less impairing of the father’s rights by enacting amendments to the impugned provisions, which provide that the Director of Vital Statistics must include a father’s particulars on his child’s registration of birth, if the application is accompanied by a paternity order. These amendments demonstrate that the legislature could have chosen less drastic means than it did in the original legislation.
The fact that the impugned provisions permit a mother to “unacknowledge” for good reasons, for example where pregnancy results from rape or incest, does not justify arbitrarily exposing a father, without recourse, to the possible disadvantages that flow from an unacknowledgment that protects neither her legitimate interests nor the best interests of the child.
The impugned provisions are not saved under s. 1 of the Charter. While the Act’s objective — namely, the accurate and prompt recording of births — is sufficiently important to warrant overriding Charter rights and the legislation is rationally connected to that legislative objective, the impugned provisions do not impair the rights of fathers as little as reasonably possible. The risks of mothers falsifying records from fear of the potential negative effects consequent on applications by fathers who have been justifiably unacknowledged can be essentially eliminated through means that do not negatively affect unjustifiably unacknowledged fathers’ interests. Moreover, the legislature itself has chosen means that are less impairing of the father’s rights by enacting amendments to the impugned provisions, which provide that the Director of Vital Statistics must include a father’s particulars on his child’s registration of birth, if the application is accompanied by a paternity order. These amendments demonstrate that the legislature could have chosen less drastic means than it did in the original legislation.
